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Molten salt reactors (MSRs) have a long history with the first design studies beginning in
the 1950s at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Traditionally these reactors are
thought of as thermal breeder reactors running on the thorium to 233U cycle and the his-
torical competitor to fast breeder reactors. In the recent years, there has been a growing
interest in molten salt reactors, which have been considered in the framework of the
Generation IV International Forum, because of their several potentialities and favorable
features when compared with conventional solid-fueled reactors. MSRs meet many of the
future goals of nuclear energy, in particular for what concerns an improved sustainability,
an inherent safety with strong negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, stable
coolant, low pressure operation that don not require expensive containment, easy to
control, passive decay heat cooling and unique characteristics in terms of actinide burning
and waste reduction, while benefiting from the past experience acquired with the molten
salt technology. As the only liquid-fueled reactor concept, the safety basis, characteristics
and licensing of an MSR are different from solid-uranium fueled light water reactors. In
this paper, a historical review of the major plant systems in MSR is presented. The features
of different safety characteristics of MSR power plant are reviewed and assessment in
comparison to other solid fueled light water reactors LWRs.
Copyright ª 2013, The Egyptian Society of Radiation Sciences and Applications. Production
and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction the coolant as shown in (Fig. 1). Heat is generated in theMolten salt reactors (MSRs) are liquid-fueled reactors that can
be used for burning actinides, producing electricity, producing
hydrogen, and producing fissile fuels (breeding). Fissile, fertile,
and fission products are dissolved in a high-temperature,
molten fluoride salt with a very high boiling temperature
(w1400 C). Themolten salt serves as both the reactor fuel andptian Society of Radiation
evier
gyptian Society of Radiation Sciereactor core and transported by the fuel salt to heat ex-
changers before returning to the reactor core. There exists a
broad range of design choices (LeBlanc, 2010) such as whether
graphite is used as moderator or not, whether fuel processing
for fission product removal is employed, whether the system
runs in a denatured Low-enriched uranium (LEU) state by the
inclusion of 238U and also whether one operates as a SingleSciences and Applications
nces and Applications. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Fig. 1 e Schematic representation of a typical MSR. Reproduced from GIF-IV (2002).
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salts for fissile 233U and fertile Th). These choices also dictate
whether a system has a Breeding Ratio> 1.0 (to produce
excess fissile for future startups) or a B.R¼ 1.0 to break even on
fissile production or if B.R< 1.0 making it a converter reactor
requiring annual additions of fissile fuel of some kind. The
MSR is one of six advanced reactor concepts identified by the
Generation IV (GENIV) International Forum as a candidate for
cooperative development.
The history of the molten salt reactor dates back to the
1950s. The design was first proposed as the propulsion
system of a nuclear-powered aircraft at the Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory (MacPherson, 1985). After the program
finished, the emphasis was put on the research of MSR
running on the thorium fuel cycle. In the 1960s the project
focused on the breeding possibilities, resulting in the design
of the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) (Robertson, 1978).
An experiment, called molten salt reactor experiment
(MSRE) (Prince, Ball, Engel, Haubenreich, & Kerlin, 1968) has
been carried out from 1965 to 1969. The reactor has been
operated with 233U in early 1969. This was the first time 233U
fuel was used as reactor fuel. The salt of this reactor did not
contain any thorium because it was intended to simulate
only the fuel stream of a two-fluid breeder reactor. The MSR
program was terminated in 1976 although the results of the
experiment were promising. The MSR without the compli-
cated chemical removal processes is a converter reactor
with high conversion ratio if thorium is added to the fuel(Perry, 1975). Oak Ridge did continue a modest program until
the early 1980s, with a greatly increased value placed on
maximizing proliferation resistance. ORNL examined oper-
ating on denatured cycles in which all uranium stayed
below the weighted average of 12% 233U and/or 20% 235U.
The results were surprisingly successful, with two routes
examined, both termed DMSR for Denatured Molten Salt
Reactor. The first a DMSR break even design (Engel et al.,
1978) with similar fission product processing to the MSBR
and showed that break even breeding could be accom-
plished even while remaining in a denatured state using
depleted 238U and Th as the fertile makeup. The second was
a greatly simplified DMSR converter design called the “30
Year Once Through Design” (Engel et al., 1980) without any
fuel processing beyond chemistry control for a full 30 years
while still maintaining a very high conversion ratio and
excellent uranium resource utilization. Both designs also
featured larger, low power density cores that gave a full 30
year lifetime of the graphite.
The MSR concept deserves renewed interest and re-
evaluation, because it can satisfy today’s priorities to (Moir
et al., 2008):
e minimize weapons useable material in storage,
e minimize need for high level waste repository space,
e increase the proliferation resistance of nuclear energy
e make beneficial use of spent fuel from LWRs,
e increase resource utilization,
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hydrogen production) at a cost competitive with
alternatives.
According to reactor safety definition, there are many
possible definitions of a “safe” reactor. Where as for reactors
employing solid oxide fuel, the most elementary demonstra-
tion of safety is one in which it can be proven that all (or
almost all) fission products remain within the fuel sheath
following all Postulated Initiating Event (PIE). Implicit in this
requirement is that the fuel pellets should never reach the
molten state (Meneley & Muzumdar, 2009). Where in case of
MSR the safety defining approach, taking into account a fuel in
a liquid form within the coolant and the safety aspects of the
chemistry-controlled phenomena. This mean safety depends
upon keeping actinides and fission products in solution.2. Basic characteristics of MSR safety
Themost important safety performances are coming from the
following factors (Furukawa et al., 1999):
(1) The primary and secondary systems have pressure lower
than 5 bar, and do not have the danger of accidents due to
high pressure such a system destruction or salt leakage.
(2) The fuel and coolant salts are chemically inert, and no
firing or explosive with air or water (as occurred in the
Fukushima accident).
(3) The boiling point of fuel salt is about 1670 K ormore, much
higher than the operation temperature 973 K. Therefore
the pressure of primary system cannot increase.
(4) The fuel salt will be able to become just critical when it
coexists with the graphite moderator. Therefore, leaked
fuel salt will not induce any criticality accident.
[EPIthermal-type MSR is not the same.]
(5) MSR has a large prompt negative temperature coefficient
of fuel salt. The temperature coefficient of graphite is
slightly positive, but controllable due to the slow temper-
ature increase depending on its high heat capacity.
(6) The delayed-neutron fraction in 233U fission is smaller
than that in 235U, and half of the delayed neutrons is
generated outside the core. However, it is controllable
owing to the longer neutron life, and large negative prompt
temperature coefficient of fuel salt.
(7) As the fuel composition can be made up anytime if
necessary, the excess reactivity and required control rod
reactivity are sufficiently small, and the reactivity shift by
control rods is small.
(8) Gaseous fission products such as Kr, Xe and T are contin-
uously removed from fuel salt, minimizing their leakage in
accidents and in the chemical processing.
2.1. MSRs safety concept
In general the safety of nuclear reactors consists of:
- Inherent safety (self regulation system) features: Negative
temperature coefficient. Negative void coefficient. Inherent orfull passive safety design depends only on physical phenom-
ena such as convection, gravity or resistance to high tem-
peratures, not on functioning of engineered components.
- Engineered safety (defense in depth).2.1.1. Inherent safety features
It has always been the dream of reactor designers to produce
plants with inherent safetydreactor assembly, fuel and
power-generation components engineered in such a way that
the reactor will, without human intervention, remain stable or
shut itself down in response to any accident, electrical outage,
abnormal change in load or other mishap. All reactors should
have inherent safety, which is achieved by suppression of
power change by designing the reactor with a negative power
coefficient. Because the temperature coefficient of fuel salt is
prompt negative and large, this condition is satisfied inMSR in
addition to others inherent features:
- Firstly negative temperature coefficient of reactivity. MSRs
passively regulate their own temperature. If the reactor
overheats, then reactivity in the core automatically slows
down. That is, strong negative temperature coefficient of
reactivity. The temperature dependence comes from 3
sources. The first is that thorium absorbsmore neutrons if it
overheats, the so-called Doppler effect (Mathieu et al., 2006).
This leaves fewer neutrons to continue the chain reaction,
reducing power. The second effect it has to do with thermal
expansion of the fuel (Mathieu et al., 2006). If the fuel
overheats, it expands considerably, which, due to the liquid
nature of the fuel, will push fuel out of the active core re-
gion. In a small or well moderated core this reduces the
reactivity. However in a large under-moderated core less
fuel salt means better moderation and thus more reactivity
(the size does not have a significant impact on the feedback
coefficients because the neutron spectrum changes very
little with the size. The slight evolution of the coefficient is
due to the difference in neutron escapes, which are more
likely in smaller reactors). This response permits the desir-
able property of load followingdunder conditions of
changing electricity demand (load), the reactor requires no
intervention to respond with automatic increases or de-
creases in power production. The third part is the graphite
moderator, that usually causes a positive contribution to the
temperature coefficient (Mathieu et al., 2006).
- Secondly, MSRs operate at atmospheric pressure and use no
water, thus eliminating the risk of a steam or hydrogen
explosion. The MSRs design appears, in its present state of
research and design, to possess an extremely high degree of
inherent safety. The single most volatile aspect of current
nuclear reactors is the pressurized water. In boiling light-
water, pressurized light-water, and heavy water reactors
(accounting for nearly all of the 441 reactors worldwide),
water serves as the coolant and neutron moderator. The
heat of fission causeswater to boil, either directly in the core
or in a steam generator, producing steam that drives a tur-
bine. The water is maintained at high pressure to raise its
boiling temperature. The explosive pressures involved are
contained by a system of highly engineered, highly
Table 1 e Comparison of reactor shutdown functions.
Demand function LWR MSR Merit on MSR
High speed shutdown system (scram) Control rod Control rod Enough with small numbers
Second shutdown system Boric acid injection system Fuel-salt drain system No re-criticality in drain tank
Third shutdown system Fuel-salt composition
adjusting system
Also used for makeup of thorium
component
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boundary”), and the ultimate line of defense is the massive,
expensive containment building surrounding the reactor,
designed to withstand any explosive calamity and prevent
the release of radioactivematerials propelled by pressurized
steam. A signature safety feature of the LFTR design is that
the coolantdliquid fluoride saltdis not under pressure. The
fluoride salt does not boil below 1400 C. Neutral pressure
reduces the cost and the scale of LFTR plant construction by
reducing the scale of the containment requirements,
because it obviates the need to contain a pressure explosion.
Disruption in a transport line would result in a leak, not an
explosion, which would be captured in a noncritical
configuration in a catch basin, where it would passively cool
and harden (Hargraves & Moir, 2010).
- Also the fuel in an MSR is already in liquid form, it cannot
melt down and in an emergency situation it can be quickly
drained out of the reactor into a passively cooled dump tank.
MSRs designs have a freeze plug at the bottomof the coreda
plug of salt, cooled by a fan to keep it at a temperature below
the freezing point of the salt. If temperature rises beyond a
critical point, the plugmelts, and the liquid fuel in the core is
immediately evacuated, pouring into a sub-critical geome-
try in a catch basin. This formidable safety tactic is only
possible if the fuel is a liquid.
One of the current requirements of the USA Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) for certification of a new
nuclear plant design is that in the event of a complete
electricity outage, the reactor remains at least stable for
several days if it is not automatically deactivated. As it
happens, the freeze-plug safety feature is as old as Alvin
Weinberg’s 1965 Molten Salt Reactor Experiment design,
yet it meets the NRC’s requirement; at ORNL, the “old
nukes” would routinely shut down the reactor by simply
cutting the power to the freeze-plug cooling system. This
setup is the ultimate in safe power outage response.
Power isn’t needed to shut down the reactor, for example
by manipulating control elements. Instead power is
needed to prevent the shutdown of the reactor (Hargraves
& Moir, 2010).
So, from “inherently safe” point of viewMSRs comes closer
to this ideal case than does any water-cooled reactors. This is
inherently much safer, eliminating almost all the (water-
based) risks of current reactors.
2.1.2. Engineering safety features
Engineering safety features are based on the defense in depth
(DID) philosophy. Which adapted to assure higher safety of
the nuclear facility, taking in the following three different
levels:Level 1: Prevention of abnormal operation and failures: by
provisions in design, manufacturing, construction, operating
and maintenance.
Level 2: Control of abnormal operation and detection of fail-
ures by: abnormality detection in an early stage, plant
Inherent features and the reactor shutdown system.
Level 3: Prevention of the large release of radioactivematerials :
by setting up containment and Emergency Core Cooling System
ECCS. The multiple defense concept in the MSR should be the
same as LWR but it must be obvious that defense in depth for a
MSR must operate in a quite different way than for a LWR.
In LWR, the defense in depth approach to the safety design
followed intuitively from the configuration of a LWR, which
provides 3 important physical barriers to the release of the
fission products to the environment viz, the clad on the fuel
element, where the fission products are generated, the reactor
vessel, which contains all the fuel elements forming a reactor
core and the leak-tight containment, which is supposed to
keep any fission products inside the containment from
escaping to the environment. Assuring the integrity of each of
these physical barriers in any accident scenario becomes the
defense in depth approach against the release of radioactivity
to the public environment (Sehgal, 2006).
In case of MSR many of the defense features of the LWR
are not required. For example, the massive steel pressure
vessel can be dispensed with since MSRs operate under at-
mospheric pressure. If the pressure vessel is removed from
design in case of MSR, we loose one of the physical barriers
present in the LWR defense in depth system. Also, LWRs
coolant failure is a hazard because it leads to core meltdown.
We have seen that much of the LWR’s defense in depth
system is devoted to prevention of core melt down, a molten
core would represent a partial failure of the reactor defense
system. Since the core of the MSR is already molten, from the
viewpoint of the NRC the MSR violates profoundly important
safety rules.
So, It must be obvious then that defense in depth for a MSR
must operate in a quite different fashion than for a LWR.
Reactor defenses are the most reliable if they depend on the
automatic operation of laws of nature, rather than human
intervention (Moir & Teller, 2008). Defense in depth in neces-
sitated with undesirable events an unlikely but not impos-
sible. Defense in depth thus is about defense against the
unlikely. The purpose of defense in depth is to make the un-
likely even more unlikely, if not impossible. More defense in
depths are not needed if undesirable consequences cease to
be matters of practical concern, or when they stop being
theoretically impossible.
MSR Defense in Depth: According to MoireTeller View
(Moir & Teller, 2008), the levels of MSR defenses are:
Table 2 e Comparison of cooling functions of core in emergency.
Demand function LWR MSR Remark on MSR
Cooling water
makeup
ECCS Unnecessary Unnecessary (drain system
can be used as backup)
Heat removal Decay-heat
removal system
Decay-heat
removal system
For severe accident
countermeasure
Table 3 e Comparison of radioactive materials confinement functions.
Wall number LWR MSR Remark on MSR
1 Pellet None (liquid fuel) No LOCA, gaseous fission
products are removed always
2 Cladding None (liquid fuel) Same as above
3 Pressure vessel, pipes Reactor vessel, pipes Very low pressure
4 Containment High temperature
confinement
No steam generation,
no flammable gas generation
5 Reactor building Reactor building Same as LWR
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ture slows down and eventually stops the nuclear reaction;
- the low fuel burn upmargin and fast burnup ratee failure to
add new fuel slows and then stops the chain reaction
process;
- the continuous removal of radioactive gasses;
- the addition primary core containment structure, piping,
drain tanksandother fuel holdingandprocessing structures;
- the reactor system chamber;
- an outer containment vessel;
- an underground location requiring escaping radioactive
materials to counteract the forces of gravity before any
above surface excursion.
Other potential barriers exist. In two fluid MSRs, the blan-
ket containment structure constitutes another safety barrier.
Core salts breaching core containment must mix with blanket
salts and then breach the blanket.3. Key aspect of nuclear safety (safety
functions)
For the confinement of radioactivity all reactor should have
the following three safety functions:
a Reactor shutdown function: in case of trouble occurs,
quickly insert all control rods into reactor to stop (shut
down) the fission and to terminate the energy generation.
b Cooling function of the reactor: in case reactor water level
usually decreases, inject water into reactor to keep the
integrity of the fuel, and to prevent the release of
radioactivity.
c Confinement function of radioactive materials: in case of
big accidents and radioactive material is released to pri-
mary containment vessel, prevent a leakage from primary
containment vessel (PCV) to outside environment.
The above three safety function inMSRwill be explained as
follows (Furukawa et al., 1999):a Reactor shutdown function:
This condition is satisfied inMSR through different systems
in addition to inherent self stabilization as in all reactors by
designing the reactor with a negative power coefficient. As
shown in Table 1, Control rods are used for a rapid shut-
down, and the fuel-salt drain system is also able to be used
as another reactor shutdown function. Because the excess
reactivity is small, the number of control-rods is few and
the diameter is large. The reliability will be high. The drain
system is always necessary and effective on the pipe
rupture accident. Since the fuel salt falls to the drain tank
by gravity through the freeze valve with a simple mecha-
nism, its reliability is high. Although the freeze-valve
operation may be slow, rapid response needs not due to
no re-criticality.
As a third measure, the adjustment of fuel composition
using fuel-salt controlling system is possible to shutdown
the reactor. One approach will be the Th addition, which is
necessary tomake up fuel salt in anyMSR, and again a slow
action of this system does not cause any problem.
b Cooling function of the reactor (Table 2):
In MSR, the possibility of piping rupture is very low due to
the low pressure, and the ECCS will not need the same as
Fast breeder Reactor FBR (Monju FBR in Japan). It is possible
to deal with the drain system, even if a piping rupture
causes the fuel salt loss. Of course the decay heat removal
system is necessary for the drain system.
The MSR may have a capability of natural circulation when
all pumps stop, because the pressure loss in the core is
small. When natural circulation cannot be expected, or
when a turbine system is isolated and the cooling by the
secondary loop is impossible, the decay-heat removal sys-
tem is necessary. As a final heat sink, the decay heat
removal system by a static air cooler as in FBR is preferable
to endure a long term severe accident, such as all AC power
supply loss (“station black out”) accident.
c Confinement function of radioactive materials at accident
(Table 3):
For this purpose, five barriers are applied in LWR. The first
two barriers do not exist in MSR because MSR uses fluid
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products (FP) is smaller due to their continuous removal
from fuel salt, and the danger of piping rupture is also very
low. Therefore it is thought that the MSR safety is better
than LWR.
The primary system of MSR is enclosed in a “high temper-
ature confinement” and the entire reactor system is
covered in the “containment” which is a reactor building
itself. These arrangements are basically equal to the LWR.
Since there is no water and no flammable gas generation,
the MSR safety is excellent due to very few events which
can threaten the integrity of containment.4. Accidents control
4.1. Design basis accident (DBAs)
4.1.1. Power increase accident or RIA (reactivity initiated
accident) (Yoshioka, Shimazu, & Mitachi, 2012)
Control rod withdrawal/ejection accident: This is a most
typical reactivity initiated accident (RIA). If we adopt a control
rod made of neutron absorbing material, and when this con-
trol rod is inserted in operation and is withdrawn or ejected by
some equipment failure or operator error, then RIA occurs. If
we adopt a control rod made of graphite, which was proposed
for MSBR, insertion of graphite control rod increases more
neutron moderation and it may cause RIA. Owing to large
negative reactivity coefficient of fuel-salt temperature, power
excursion terminates, even if control rod scram function fails.
Meanwhile, reactivity coefficient of graphite temperature is
slightly positive, but this does not cause any problem, because
heat transfer to graphite is slow. On the other hand,MSR has a
longer prompt neutron lifetime than LWR, and this fact miti-
gates the maximum neutron flux.
4.1.2. Flow decrease accident (pump trip accident)
If all fuel-salt pumps trip (stop), heat removal function is lost.
(In LWR licensing, one pump trip is categorized to AOT, and all
pumps trip is categorized to DBA.) Then, fuel-salt temperature
increases. Also, delayed neutrons increase in the core when
salt circulation stops, and it causes the same effect as positive
reactivity insertion. This is because normally some of delayed
neutrons are lost out of the core. However, owing to the
negative reactivity coefficient, its consequence is not as severe
as pump seizure accident. In this pump trip accident case,
control rods are inserted and nuclear fissions stop (Yoshioka
et al., 2012). In MSR, there is judgment that “the reactor is
safe for the stop of all primary pumps, if an appropriate scram
system is designed” (Furukawa et al., 1999).
4.1.3. Fuel-salt leak accident (primary loop break accident)
(Yoshioka et al., 2012)
If rupture or break of vessel, pipes, pumps, heat exchangers,
and other small pipes occurs by some reasons other than
pressure/heat, then the integrity of primary loop is lost, and
fuel salt will leak out. Of course, leaked salt is caught by a
catch-pan, and collected in a drain tank or an emergency
drain tank. Regarding the rupture of heat exchanger,mixing of
fuel salt and secondary-salt must be evaluated. The causes ofthese accidents may be manufacturing flaw, excessive wall
temperatures and stresses, corrosion, thermal stress cycling,
and so on. In this accident scenarios as shown, fuel salt must
be transferred to a drain tank, and this system assures high
safety of MSR.
4.2. Severe accidents
For nuclear reactors it is common to consider three types of
severe accidents: criticality accident, failure to remove after
heat and a melt down. The melt down is not an accident by
itself but rather a description of a consequence of an accident.
4.2.1. The source term
The source term is themeasure of the radiation which needs to
be contained from reaching any sensitive location or target. The
energy contained in the source term also provides the driving
force for dispersionof the source termas it also ameasure of the
afterheat, or theenergy, todamageareactor intheeventofheat-
removal failureor lossof coolant accident (LOCA). For anMSR,as
for any fluid fuel reactor, on-line fuel processing can be applied.
The on-line processing, at the least, removes the gaseous and
volatile part of the source term (Gat & Dodds, 2008). Fission
products (with the exception of xenon and krypton) andnuclear
materials arehighly soluble in the salt andwill remain in the salt
under operating and expected accident conditions. The fission
products that are not soluble (e.g. xenon and krypton) are
continuously removed from the molten fuel salt, solidified,
packaged, and stored in passively cooled storage vaults (C.W.
Forsberg, 2004). The MSRs processing can be adjusted to have a
small source term. The safety advantages of this small source
term are many fold (Gat & Dodds, 2008): The driving force for
dispersion is reduced and there are no major stored energy
sources within containment such as high pressure fluids [heli-
um and water] or reactive fluids [sodium]. This reduce re-
quirements for the containment (C.W. Forsberg, 2004); also the
gaseous and volatile components, which are the most likely to
disperse, are essentially all but eliminated (Gat & Dodds, 2008);
the long half-life isotopes (elements) are reduced such that the
long-termeffect of even themostunlikelyaccident isnot severe;
and, the short-lived isotopes require a proportionately short-
term protection time till they decay (Gat & Dodds, 2008).
4.2.2. Criticality accident
In MSRs with processing, the criticality accident is essentially
eliminated. There are two factors that make an excess reac-
tivity incident unlikely, temperature control and optimized
geometry. The MSR can be temperature controlled. The large
negative temperature coefficient allows for control without
control rods or other mechanically operated control mecha-
nism (some designs included low worth rods for minor tem-
perature control). The control rods can be used for
temperature regulation. Continuous fuel processing, with the
ability to externally add fissile material when needed, reduces
the need for excess reactivity inventory (Gat & Dodds, 2008).
The MSR can be designed so that bred fuel, at a breeding ratio
of 1.0, keeps the reactor at equilibrium with fertile-material
feed and with no need to add fissile material. Since the fuel
is also the coolant, the reactor is largely temperature
controlled regardless of the power.
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design for criticality in the core. The externally cooled reactor
has neither coolant nor structural materials in the core that
may require design compromises and thus can truly be opti-
mized for safety. This core optimization also assures that no
criticality, or re-criticality, outside the core can occur (Gat &
Dodds, 2008).
4.2.3. Decay heat accident
Molten salt reactors use passive emergency core cooling sys-
tems that are radically different from those used in solid-fuel
reactors. The fluid nature of the fuel means that the reactor
core meltdown is an irrelevant term. The liquid state of the
core also enables in most emergencies a passive, thermally
triggered fuel salt draining into bunkered, and geometrically
sub-critical, multiple dump tanks, which are provided with
passive decay heat cooling systems (see Fig. 1). Actually, at the
bottom of the core, MSR designs have a freeze plug (a plug of
salt, actively cooled by a fan to keep it at a temperature below
the freezing point of the salt). If the fuel salt overheats and its
temperature rises beyond a critical point, the freeze plug
melts, and the liquid fuel overflows by gravity and is imme-
diately evacuated from the core, pouring into the emergency
dump tanks. This formidable safety tactic is only possible if
the fuel is a liquid. Power is not needed to shutdown the
reactor, for example by manipulating control elements, but it
is needed to prevent the shutdown of the reactor (Luzzi,
Aufiero, Cammi, & Fiorina, 2012).5. Licensing
Although two experimental MSRs have been built and
operated in the United States under government ownership,
none has ever been subjected to formal licensing or even
detailed review by the NRC (Engel et al., 1980). Accident
analysis for molten salt reactors MSR has been investigated
and several calculations were made for experimental re-
actors: MSRE. However, it was 50 years ago, and it may not
be applicable from the standpoint of recent licensing
approach for light water reactor (LWR). Since then, no
guidelines or safety criteria have been defined for MSR ac-
cident analysis. Regarding the safety criteria, and as shown
in Refs. Yoshioka et al. (2012) and Shimazu and Yoshioka
(2010) authors showed one proposal based on a tempera-
ture limitation of the component: Hastelloy N, in the pre-
vious London Conference.
The licensing-related design and safety features combine
those of a reactor and a chemical processing plant. Because
prescriptive safety regulations were developed for solid-fuel
reactors, many of the prescriptive safety regulations are not
applicable to an MSR. Further, the licensing experience of
solid-fueled reactors can be used as only a general guide
because of significant fundamental differences between
those systems and MSRs. Liquid fueled reactors use
different approaches to reactor safety than solid fueled re-
actors. These include (https://inlportal.inl.gov/portal/
server): (1) draining the fuel into critically safe, passively
cooled tanks if off-normal conditions occur, (2) limiting
excess reactivity by on-line fuel processing and/orcontinuous fueling, and (3) limiting fission product source
terms by on-line processing. The current regulatory struc-
ture was developed with the concept of solid-fuel reactors.
The comparable regulatory requirements for this system
must be defined. Using current tools, appropriate safety
analysis is required followed by appropriate research on the
key safety issues.
The MSR requires that the safety basis be defined in terms
of performance goals with a rethinking of how those goals are
met. While a probabilistic safety analysis has not been done
on an MSR, the available evidence suggests significantly
different concerns. The characteristics of the MSR suggests
that the probability and consequences of a large accident to be
much smaller than most solid-fuel reactors.
At the same time, the processing and other operations
indicate greater concerns associated with smaller accidents.
The MSR incorporates most of the fuel cycle with the reactor;
thus, risk comparisons with other reactors must consider the
entire fuel cycle (C. Forsberg, 2004).6. Conclusions
Safety of MSRs are reviewed and assessment compared to
conventional solid fueled LWRs. MSRs are safer and more
stable since they don’t reach high enough temperatures for
meltdown (since the fuel is in a molten state) and the pri-
mary system is at a low operating pressure even at high
temperature, due to the high boiling point (w 1400 C at
atmospheric pressure) and therefore do not require expen-
sive containment or highly pressurized hot water. The MSR
is not subject to safety concerns from chemical or me-
chanical violent reactions or explosions. The basic features
of MSRs give the solutions for many problems for others
solid fueled light water reactors, and eliminate the reasons
for serious last accidents like TMI, Chernobyl and Fukush-
ima and more of basis and severe accidents will be
decreased and limited. The MSR comparable regulatory re-
quirements must be defined and probabilistic safety anal-
ysis is required and quantitative evaluation for several
accidents are needed.r e f e r e n c e s
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